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Piracy is an increasingly costly and violent threat to commercial shipping and other vessels off the Horn of
Africa. However, because pirates operate in small vessels that cannot navigate or attack in high seas or winds,
pirate activity is highly sensitive to environmental conditions. The US Naval Oceanographic Office provides
an operational forecast of the pirate threat; counterpiracy forces use this forecast to allocate their efforts over
several million square miles. The most recent version uses simulation to model the effects of pirate behavior in
interaction with winds, waves, and currents over time to forecast the geographic distribution of the pirate threat.
As part of the development of the pirate behavior model, one author traveled to Bahrain to interview counter-
piracy forces. We then used carefully designed simulation experiments to identify the variables that are most
influential in determining the distribution of predicted pirate activity. The results confirmed the importance
of elements of the pirate behavior model that were derived from our operator interviews, informed decisions
regarding operational settings for key parameters, and generated insights to guide future updates to the model
and intelligence-gathering efforts. The resulting model uses our recommendations, including alternate pirate
search patterns. It has been operational since March 2011 and is briefed daily to the senior leadership of US
Naval Forces Central Command.
Key words : defense; applications of simulation; design of experiments.
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Piracy Threat and
Environmental Factors
The instability and lack of government in Somalia
have led to a rapid increase in pirate activity in the
Somali Basin Region and the Gulf of Aden. The num-
ber of incidents, hostages, and the size of ransoms
have all been rising steadily since 2005. In Febru-
ary 2011, four United States (US) citizens were killed
by Somali pirates and, according to the International
Maritime Bureau (IMB), almost 200 people are cur-
rently being held hostage by Somali pirates (IMB
2012). Chalk (2008) cites estimates showing that the
cost to the shipping industry is up to $16 billion annu-
ally, and increasing.
Whereas pirates continue to operate successfully,
collecting multimillion-dollar ransoms and improv-
ing their equipment and tactics, they have followed
the shipping lanes further into the Indian Ocean and
search as far south as the tenth parallel. They can now
operate in an area of several million square miles.
Counterpiracy forces, comprising about 30 vessels,
half of which are organized into international task
forces (Kirk 2011), must allocate their limited assets
over this enormous area.
Pirates search in small vessels that cannot navi-
gate in high seas or winds; therefore, their activity is
highly sensitive to meteorological and oceanographic
(METOC) conditions. They attack by approaching at
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Figure 1: In this photograph, a pirate skiff approaches a German Navy
frigate. A small cargo vessel is at least twice as large as the frigate
(C. Hutchins, pers. comm.).
high speed and boarding much larger ships from
small skiffs. Figure 1 shows a pirate skiff approach-
ing a larger vessel. Historically, very few attacks occur
in waves over one meter high (Hansen et al. 2011),
because these waves make both high-speed pursuit
and scaling the sides of a large vessel very difficult.
Moreover, in addition to avoiding or otherwise
responding to METOC conditions, pirate vessels’
movements are affected directly by winds and cur-
rents. In some cases, they are known to drift in the
search zone, waiting for target vessels to appear. This
conserves fuel, allows them to search longer, and
means that their movements (while drifting) will be
determined solely by METOC conditions.
First-Generation Piracy Predictions
In March 2009, the Commander Naval Meteorology
and Oceanography Command, challenged the
METOC community to develop an informational
product to support counterpiracy operations
off Somalia. The Naval Oceanographic Office
(NAVOCEANO) rapidly developed a prototype, the
piracy performance surface (PPS), which it presented
at a piracy conference hosted by the Office of Naval
Intelligence (ONI). Coincidentally, the President of
Maersk, whose US-flagged ship, Maersk Alabama,
was hijacked on April 12, 2009, attended the confer-
ence, thus emphasizing the increase in attacks and
need for tools to be used in antipiracy operations.
The PPS product was received well; according to
Admiral Gilbride, Director of the National Mar-
itime Intelligence Center, the “product was a game
changer” (B. Lingsch, pers. comm.).
The PPS, which we will call the first-generation
product, was a watershed for the METOC commu-
nity. It was the first operational product to integrate
METOC and intelligence (INTEL) information. The
PPS displays a map of the region, colored to reflect the
piracy threat at each point on the map; for example,
dark (light) indicates regions with a greater (lesser)
pirate threat. Following the convention of US Navy
METOC, we call this kind of map a surface. Each
forecast lead time—it forecasts out 72 hours in three-
hour increments—has its own map. Figure 2 shows
an example.
The piracy threat is represented by an index,
which is a weighted function of the suitability of
forecast METOC conditions (at a given lead time)
to pirate attack and the geographic distribution of
prior observed pirate attacks, where ONI deter-
mines the two weights. The environmental suit-
ability is a weighted function of waves and wave
steepness, where the suitability of each variable is a
piecewise-linear function and NAVOCEANO deter-
mines the weights.
Only the instantaneous forecast values of the envi-
ronmental variables are used in calculating the index.
Therefore, if environmental conditions are forecast to
be suitable for a pirate attack in 48 hours at a given
point in the region, then the surface will reflect a high
pirate threat at that time, even if conditions during
the prior 48 hours would prevent any pirates from
reaching that point.
NAVOCEANO set out to improve the product
almost immediately, and made various upgrades in
2009 and 2010. In addition, it undertook the develop-
ment of a next-generation product.
Next-Generation Piracy Predictions
NAVOCEANO and one of the authors developed the
next-generation model, called the pirate attack risk
surface (PARS). PARS produces a surface that looks
like the PPS, but is generated and interpreted very
differently.
Three conditions are required for a pirate attack
at a given place and time: (1) instantaneous METOC
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Figure 2: This figure, a map of the Somali Basin Region and the Gulf of Aden, shows the piracy performance
surface (PPS). Dark regions (red in the original) indicate high pirate risk, whereas light areas (green in the
original) indicate low risk. The bull’s-eye to the west of the Gulf of Aden (top center, between the Horn of Africa
and the Arabian Peninsula) indicates a recent pirate attack in that area.
conditions must be suitable for pursuit and attack;
(2) a vulnerable target vessel, usually a commercial
ship, must be present; and (3) pirates must be present.
Users may view a map showing the probability of any
of these three conditions for each forecast lead time.
Each point in the PARS is determined by multiply-
ing the probabilities of these three conditions being
met (see Figure 3). In Figure 3, the pirate presence
model uses METOC forecasts at multiple lead times
prior to the PARS valid time to capture the inter-
action between pirates’ behavior, termed concept of
operations (CONOPs), and METOC conditions that
determine pirates’ likely locations. The suitability of
METOC conditions for attack is determined by a fore-
cast valid at the same time as the PARS.
The PARS simulation-based approach to forecasting
pirate presence is an improvement on the first-
generation piracy prediction product for several
reasons. It provides a surface that has a real-world
interpretation as the probability of a pirate attack
(conditional on the occurrence of an attack anywhere
in the region), rather than an index that lacks nat-
ural units. It can evolve in response to information
about pirate activity and changes in pirate capabilities
and tactics. In addition, it uses simulation to integrate
the effects of pirate behavior with METOC conditions
over time (see Figure 3). This allows it to capture the
cumulative effect of winds, waves, and currents on
pirates’ locations over time, an effect that cannot be
captured by combining only contemporaneous snap-
shots of METOC conditions and INTEL.
In March 2011, the PARS became operational in par-
allel with the PPS; it replaced the PPS in December
2011. It takes input from the intelligence commu-
nity daily and when pirate activity is observed; it
also takes environmental forecasts as input. It then
uses the pirate behavior model to predict the tempo-
ral and geographic distribution of pirate presence in
the region. The PARS combines this distribution with
information about commercial shipping density and
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Figure 3: This figure illustrates the operational pirate attack risk surface (PARS), highlighting the pirate presence
model.
suitability of environmental conditions for attack to
estimate the probability of a pirate attack. The model
runs every 24 hours and produces forecasts out to
72 hours in three-hour increments. It is briefed daily
to the Commander, Naval Forces Central Command at
the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) headquarters.
Verifying the PARS is a challenge for two rea-
sons. First, because it depends on real-time INTEL
inputs, it cannot be recreated for historical peri-
ods. Therefore, only its operational predictions can
be verified. Second, the surface and some of the
pirate activity data against which it would be verified
are classified. Qualitatively, the product’s predictions
correlate positively with pirate attacks. The PPS also
showed this relationship—a higher PPS index was
associated with a higher probability of attack. How-
ever, the probabilities were much less differentiated:
the PPS predicted high threat levels for much larger
regions, and therefore was less informative.
The pirate presence prediction is based on a dis-
crete-time simulation that models pirates’ behavior—
in Navy parlance, their CONOPs—and responses
to METOC conditions. The research described in
this paper supported the development of the pirate
presence model, which is the most complex part of
the PARS product.
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Operator Interviews
In June 2010, Leslie Slootmaker, then a masters stu-
dent at the Naval Postgraduate School, visited the
CMF headquarters in Bahrain to meet with US North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and European
Union (EU) forces involved in counterpiracy and
familiar with the first-generation piracy prediction
product. She briefed and interviewed counterpiracy
forces to learn:
• how they use the first-generation product;
• their mental models of current pirate CONOPs;
and
• their feedback on the preliminary pirate CONOPs
model.
In addition to familiarizing the PARS development
team at NAVOCEANO and the Naval Research Labo-
ratory (NRL) with the terminology used by the CMF,
this interaction with users improved our understand-
ing of pirate CONOPs. In particular, we learned that
pirates in the region are operating increasingly from
larger logistical ships—this not only extends their
range (in both distance and duration), but also means
that rather than dispersing to search independently
once they reach their intended search region, groups
of pirate skiffs tend to stay together throughout their
mission. Therefore, the simulated pirate entity oper-
ates as a group, which we call a pirate action group
(PAG), instead of a single vessel.
Pirate Presence Model
In the operational PARS, a model of pirate CONOPs
affects both the attack surface (see the bottom center
of Figure 3—where can pirates mount an attack?) and
the pirate presence distribution (see the top center of
Figure 3—where are pirates likely to be?). In the pirate
presence model, each simulated PAG starts from a
base, transits to a search waypoint, searches for target
vessels, and then returns to the base. It returns to the
base when it either encounters adverse METOC con-
ditions or its mission length, less the time required to
return to the base, is reached.
The impact of METOC conditions is modeled using
thresholds for winds and waves, above which a PAG
will not operate. If a simulated PAG encounters envi-
ronmental conditions exceeding its threshold, it will
evade the bad weather until it can resume its search
pattern or near the maximum duration of the mis-
sion and must return to the base. In addition, with a
probability designated operationally by ONI, a PAG
may have advance knowledge of METOC conditions,
and therefore choose a search waypoint where condi-
tions are forecast to be suitable.
Parameters describing each PAG are sampled in a
Monte Carlo fashion; they include its base location
and search waypoint, search pattern, mission length,
METOC thresholds, and transit speed. In the earli-
est versions of the pirate CONOPs model, pirates
drifted with waves and currents once they reached
their search waypoints. Based on Slootmaker’s inter-
views, we introduced more complex search patterns.
In the operational PARS pirate presence model, a PAG
may use one of four search patterns:
1. simple drift (movement is determined only by
winds and currents);
2. random walk (PAG motors according to a ran-
dom walk);
3. zig-zag (PAG motors east to west and vice versa
across a south-to-north transit lane); or
4. transit (PAG transits from base to waypoint and
back).
Regardless of the search pattern, the PAG’s move-
ment is affected by winds and currents. Therefore,
at each 12-minute time step, the PAG sets a course
and speed; we then add a component to reflect
drift with winds and currents, plus a small random
component.
METOC Forecasts
The PARS uses METOC forecasts for 0–72 hours,
every six hours, to produce corresponding forecasts of
pirate attack risk. METOC forecasts and pirate pres-
ence forecasts are on 0.25-by-0.25-degree cells, about
15 square nautical miles, over the region. The wind
forecasts are from the Navy’s operational global atmo-
spheric prediction system (National Weather Service
2013), the waves are forecast by the WaveWatch III
model (National Weather Service 2012), and the cur-
rents are forecast by the Navy coastal ocean model
(Barron et al. 2003). Analyses (retrospective best esti-
mates of prior METOC conditions) based on these
models are used, together with the pirate CONOPs
model, to generate a starting distribution of simulated
PAG locations. Then, these PAG locations are pro-
jected into the future using the pirate CONOPs model
and forecasts.
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Simulation Experiments
As part of the PARS development, we used simula-
tion experiments to identify which INTEL variables
are most influential, and which have the greatest
interaction with METOC conditions. We used identi-
cal base and waypoint locations throughout because
these variables heavily influence the surface.
We conducted all experiments we describe using
hawk, the high-performance computer system of the
Air Force Research Laboratory Department of Defense
Supercomputing Resource Center.
Output Measurement
As previously discussed, because PARS depends
on INTEL parameters, hindcasting (backtesting) the
PARS risk distribution is impossible; that is, we can-
not determine ONI’s historical assessments of likely
pirate base locations, the level of activity of those
bases, or similar variables. Therefore, during PARS
development, we had no obvious performance metric.
Because our goal in the simulation experiments was
to identify which variables are most influential, we
needed a way to assess differences among surfaces
generated for different parameter settings and in dif-
ferent METOC conditions, as reflected by different
forecast lead times. Therefore, our output statistics are
measures of differences among surfaces. Design point
refers to a given set of levels for all parameters we
varied in the experiment. In this paper, we report on
two output metrics, RMSD and iRMSD:
1. RMSD is the mean (over all geographic cells) of
the root mean squared cell-by-cell difference between
a given surface and the surface created by taking the
mean of all comparables. The set of comparables is the
set of all surfaces for a given forecast lead time gen-
erated by all design points in each experiment. High
values of this metric indicate a design point that dif-
fers greatly from the others in the given experiment.
2. iRMSD is the mean (over all cells) of the root
mean squared cell-by-cell difference between the sur-
face for a given lead time and the mean of all surfaces
generated for a given design point (hence, iRMSD for
inner RMSD), over all lead times. High values for this
metric indicate that the surface is highly responsive
to changes in METOC conditions.
We explored other metrics, including smoothed ver-
sions of the above; however, because they had very
high correlations with the two selected metrics, we
excluded them from our analysis.
Memory Requirements Experiment
The PARS simulation-based approach raises some
new challenges. In particular, because it is based on
a model for pirate CONOPs, it depends critically on
good-enough INTEL regarding pirate capabilities and
tactics. In addition, the computational demands are
much greater than those of the first-generation prod-
uct. In preliminary experiments, the memory require-
ments for some design points were too great for the
hawk’s computing resources.
Before designing the INTEL experiment, we
explored the sensitivity of the PARS to the three vari-
ables that determine the memory requirements of a
given PARS run: mission length, number of replica-
tions, and number of simulated PAGs. Figure 4 shows
an example of the pirate-presence surface for two dif-
ferent mission lengths, with all other variables held
constant.
The mission length is the maximum duration, in
hours, of a given PAG’s mission. Initially, develop-
ers experimented with mission lengths of a few days
to one week. However, Slootmaker’s interviews with
operators in the CMF indicated that pirates are now
able to sustain missions of three weeks or more. Fig-
ure 5 shows that the mission lengths used in PARS
should be increased. Because the response variable in
Figure 5 (RMSD) indicates a difference from the mean
surface among the 20 design points shown, the min-
imum RMSD at 72 hours does not mean that this is
a good value for mission length, but rather that these
mission lengths produce a PARS that is close to the
average. Because RMSD increases for high mission
lengths, Figure 5 indicates that using a mission length
of one week (168 hours) or shorter is inappropriate
when INTEL data indicate that mission lengths may
be as long as several weeks. Furthermore, the max-
imum mission length in this experiment (348 hours)
is still on the low end of values the operators believe
are realistic. Although computational resources cur-
rently limit mission lengths to 168 hours, the devel-
opers now know that raising this value should be
a goal.
Based on intuition, the developers initially believed
that 512 replications were sufficient to generate stable
Slootmaker et al.: User Focus and Simulation Improve Predictions of Piracy Risk


































































Figure 4: This figure provides examples of the output of the pirate presence model, represented as a geographic
distribution (surface) of likely pirate presence, for a particular time (the 24-hour lead time in this example).
The variable settings are almost identical for these two surfaces; however, the image on the left uses a mission
length of 168 hours, whereas the image on the right uses a mission length of 336 hours.
probability distributions. However, Figure 6 shows
that the results for 512 replications would differ from
the results for 2,000 replications. The decreasing trend
shown in Figure 6 indicates that the surfaces stabilize
with increasing numbers of replications, as they begin
to match the average of multiple surfaces. In response
to this result, the operators increased the number of
replications used operationally to 1,024. We note that
the differences driven by the number of replications
are smaller than those for mission length, as shown by
comparing the units of the y-axes in Figures 5 and 6.













Figure 5: This plot shows a sensitivity analysis for mission length.
As Figure 7 shows, the number of PAGs is also
influential, within the range of realistic values. Sloot-
maker’s interviews indicated that limited knowledge
is available on how many PAGs are operating at any
one time in the region of interest, although Nelson
and Goossens (2011) estimated this number at 50.
Until recently, the number of simulated PAGs in the
PARS was set equal to the number of PAGs observed
within the previous 72 hours, typically fewer than 10,
which is a lower bound on the actual number of PAGs
operating. Based on the simulation results, we raised
the number of PAGs used in the operational PARS.
Getting better estimates of the true number is a goal
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Figure 6: This plot shows a sensitivity analysis for number of replications.
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Figure 7: This plot shows a sensitivity analysis for number of PAGs.
Pirate CONOPs Experiment
We designed the primary experiment to investi-
gate two questions: which variables describing pirate
CONOPs have (1) the most influence on PARS, and
(2) the greatest interaction with METOC conditions.
In addition, we experimented with the number of
replications to investigate whether this setting, which
drives computational requirements, interacts mean-
ingfully with the other variables to help the develop-
ers determine an acceptable operational setting.
Experimental Design. The computing limitations
described earlier required us to design a highly
efficient experiment to explore the effect of a large
number of variables. We also wanted to detect interac-
tion effects among the independent variables. There-
fore, we used a nearly orthogonal Latin hypercube
(NOLH) design that we developed using the Cioppa
and Lucas (2007) algorithm.
The Cioppa and Lucas NOLH algorithm randomly
generates many Latin-hypercube designs and selects
one that meets given constraints. Two constraints
enforce near-orthogonality—maximum constraints on
the largest magnitude pairwise correlation coefficient
and on a condition number of the matrix of design
points. Large correlations among input variables are
undesirable because they decrease the ability to differ-
entiate the effects of correlated variables on the output
metrics. Two constraints enforce good space-filling
properties—a maximum on the modified L2 discrep-
ancy and a minimum on the smallest Euclidean pair-
wise distance between design points. Space-filling
designs sample the design space efficiently through-
out the experimental region and are particularly
Variable Definition Experimental range









Replications Number of replicates of each
PAG
85–888
Skiff speed (knots) Mean speed at which PAGs
travel to and from base,
and while searching; actual





PAG’s movement in any
period is its intended
movement plus the current
drift factor times the local
current vector plus the






Wind speed above which a
PAG will cease operating,




Wave height above which a
PAG will cease operating,




The probability that a PAG will
have access to weather
forecasts
0–1




Table 1: The table shows experimental variables with definitions and max-
imum and minimum levels within the pirate CONOPs experiment.
∗For each PAG, we sample these variables from a distribution about
the mean for a given design point, with a standard deviation equal to
20 percent of the mean.
useful for identifying previously unknown nonlinear
effects (e.g., change points).
We used a predeveloped NOLH design with 10
variables and 33 design points (Sanchez 2005); vari-
able ranges shown in Table 1. The original NOLH
yielded a maximum pairwise correlation of 13.5 per-
cent, and less than 3 percent if we exclude the four-
level variable search pattern. Note that the small
number (four) of levels of the search pattern variable
limits the ability to achieve low pairwise correlations.
In addition, these levels are neither cardinal nor ordi-
nal; therefore, correlations between search pattern and
the other variables are not meaningful.
However, with the original NOLH, memory re-
quirements ranged up to more than 15 GB. We
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modified the design points that were not complete
in 30 hours to reduce memory requirements. Both
replications and number of PAGs reduced memory
requirements proportionally to the reduction in the
variable level, whereas reducing mission length led
to a greater-than-proportional reduction in memory
requirements. However, preliminary results indicated
that mission length was the most influential of the
three variables; therefore, we reduced the mission
lengths by 20 percent and the number of replications
by 60 percent, such that the completed runs had a
maximum memory requirement of 9.5 GB, and most
were less than 2 GB. In addition, the wind drift fac-
tor was a constant multiple of the current drift factor
in the original design, but a random multiple (less
than 1) in the modified design points. The final design


































































































































Figure 8: This scatterplot matrix shows the low pairwise correlations among experimental variables.
Excluding search pattern and number of replications
reduces the maximal pairwise correlation coefficient
to 16 percent. Figure 8 is a scatterplot matrix of the
independent variables showing the small correlations
among them. The pattern in the scatterplot of current
drift factor versus wind drift factor is not a feature of
the NOLH, but is an artifact of the modifications to
reduce memory requirements.
Results and Analysis. We analyzed six response vari-
ables: RMSD at the 24-, 48-, and 72-hour lead times
and iRMSD evaluated over a 24-, 48-, and 72-hour
period. We analyzed the results using simple linear
regression and regression using second-order terms,
including interactions.
The results clearly show that search pattern is by
far the most influential variable and the most statisti-
cally significant. In each model, search pattern (or an
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Term Scaled estimate
Intercept 0!0023902 0!0030705
Mission length −0!000059 0!0011199
Skiff speed −0!000267 0!0011504
Current drift factor −0!000726
−0!000722
Wind threshold −3!841e-5 0!000102
Wave threshold −0!00013 −0!000424
Weather forecast probability −7!656e-5 0!0009795
Search pattern [1–0] −0!000971 −0!001221
Search pattern [2–1] −4!549e-6 −0!000588
Search pattern [3–2] 0!0032636 0!0053018






Figure 9: The figure shows the scaled (by 0!5 × range) coefficient estimates for simple linear regressions for
RMSD at 24 hours (left) and iRMSD over 72 hours (right). Search pattern is clearly the most influential variable
in both cases.
interaction with search pattern) is statistically signif-
icant at the 1 percent level and is the most influen-
tial variable. Figure 9 provides an example showing
the search pattern influence—search pattern is highly
influential in each case. Moreover, in the six regres-
sions with interaction effects, each variable, with the
exception of current drift factor, has a significant inter-
action effect with search pattern in at least one model.
Slootmaker (2011) provides details.
This suggests that (1) the addition of alternative
search patterns to the pirate CONOPs model is a very
important contribution, and (2) the counterpiracy
24-hour lead-time 48-hour lead-time 72-hour lead-time
Step variable variable variable
RMSD
1 Search pattern 0!702 Search pattern 0!656 Search pattern 0!549
2 Wind drift 0!778 PAGs 0!689 PAGs 0!576
3 PAGs 0!796 Wind drift 0!722 Wind drift 0!606
4 Skiff speed 0!810 Search pattern∗ 0!765 Weather forecast 0!632
iRMSD
1 Search pattern 0!440 Search pattern 0!493 Search pattern 0!418
2 Skiff speed 0!534 Skiff speed 0!579 Skiff speed 0!471
3 Search pattern∗ 0!601 Current drift 0!616 Current drift 0!514
4 Wind threshold 0!654 Search pattern∗ 0!648 Weather forecast 0!549
5 Current drift 0!679 Mission length 0!675 Mission length 0!578
6 Weather forecast 0!700 Search pattern∗ 0!607
7 PAGs 0!719
8 Wind threshold 0!737
Table 2: The table summarizes the stepwise simple linear regression results. We used six response variables:
RMSD and iRMSD, each for three lead times.
∗The four-level categorical variable search pattern is represented by three dummy variables; therefore, it can
enter the model more than once. All three dummy variables appear in at least one model.
forces and INTEL community must seek to under-
stand the search strategies that pirates are using
and incorporate this information into the operational
pirate-presence model.
Table 2 summarizes the results of the simple lin-
ear regression analysis, using RMSD and iRMSD
at various lead times as the response variable. We
selected the models using a forward selection with
backward elimination algorithm based on the p-value
threshold, using 0.25 as the threshold for an enter-
ing variable and 0.1 as the threshold for a departing
variable.
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After search pattern, the most important variables
are wind drift factor and number of PAGs for the
RMSD responses, and skiff speed for the iRMSD
response variables, which reflect interaction with
METOC conditions. The importance of skiff speed,
a variable that is susceptible to refinement based
on INTEL information, suggests the importance of
INTEL regarding pirate CONOPs interacting with
METOC conditions in determining the relative distri-
bution of the pirate threat.
We note that the variables that drive memory
requirements (and run time) also appear as signifi-
cant in some models. The number of PAGs is signif-
icant in all three RMSD models, and mission length
is significant in two of the iRMSD models. In addi-
tion, both variables and the number of replications
appear in significant interaction terms in the second-
order interaction-term regression models.
Benefits
Unlike the PPS, the PARS explicitly estimates the
distribution of the pirate threat. The PARS pirate-
presence model is time integrated, modeling the
effects of METOC conditions on pirate movement
over time. The PPS largely reflected seasonal METOC
conditions, and would often designate almost the
entire Indian Ocean—an area larger than the entire
United States—as high risk (see Figure 2); however,
the PARS, which we do not show because it is classi-
fied, shows much greater differentiation in risk over
the geographic area.
The results of this research significantly influenced
the implementation of the pirate-presence portion of
the final PARS product. The alternate search patterns
that were introduced were shown to be not only
the most influential studied factor determining the
distribution of pirate risk, but also highly interactive
with METOC conditions. If not for Slootmaker’s (2011)
work, this critical factor might have been excluded
from the model, and the INTEL community might not
have been aware of the importance of gathering infor-
mation about pirates’ search strategies.
In addition, we determined that the mission lengths
being implemented operationally were unrealistically
short and could substantially affect the piracy pres-
ence prediction. Similarly, the operational settings
for number of replications and number of simulated
PAGs were within the ranges over which they affect
the resulting surface. We raised both values, and the
PARS development team at NAVOCEANO and NRL
is now aware of the importance of increasing mission
length and number of PAGs, as computing resources
permit.
Variables identified as highly influential and (or)
with a significant interaction with METOC conditions
demand the best estimates from the INTEL commu-
nity if their values are not precisely known or are
expected to change over time. In addition, if their
values could change over time, building functionality
into PARS would be important so that INTEL experts
will be able to adjust the PARS settings of these vari-
ables as their estimates change.
The ability to verify the model based on real-world
observations is limited by the availability of histor-
ical INTEL data. However, simulation experiments
allowed us to inform the development of the PARS
pirate-presence model by identifying which aspects of
the model were influential. The PARS is a big, com-
plex model to which more features are being added.
Our experiments helped the developers and operators
to better understand the model, and led to changes
that make it more realistic and insights about which
variables merit the most attention by INTEL experts.
Finally, this work highlighted that INTEL and
METOC information should be analyzed together.
This insight is consistent with the Navy’s 2010 merger
of Naval Intelligence and Communications, including
US Navy METOC, into a single information domi-
nance directorate.
Acknowledgments
The authors are very grateful to Steve Upton, whose help
was invaluable, and to Paul Sanchez, Dashi Singham, and
Chad Hutchins. This work was supported by the Office of
Naval Research [Grant N0001410WX20795] and the Naval
Postgraduate School’s Simulation, Experiments and Effi-
cient Design Center.
References
Barron CN, Rhodes RC, Smedstad LF, Rowley CD, Martin PJ,
Kara AB (2003) Global ocean nowcasts and forecasts with
the Navy Coastal Ocean model (NCOM). Accessed January
15, 2013, http://www.nrl.navy.mil/research/nrl-review/2003/
ocean-science/barron.
Chalk P (2008) The Maritime Dimension of International Security: Ter-
rorism, Piracy, and Challenges for the United States (RAND Cor-
poration, Santa Monica, CA).
Slootmaker et al.: User Focus and Simulation Improve Predictions of Piracy Risk
Interfaces 43(3), pp. 256–267, © 2013 INFORMS 267
Cioppa TM, Lucas TW (2007) Efficient nearly orthogonal and space-
filling Latin hypercubes. Technometrics 49(1):45–55.
Hansen J, Jacobs G, Hsu L, Dykes J, Dastugue J, Allard R, Barron C,
et al. (2011) Information domination: Dynamically coupling
METOC and INTEL for improved guidance for piracy inter-
diction. Accessed November 14, 2012, http://www.nrl.navy
.mil/content_images/11_FA5.pdf.
IMB Piracy Reporting Centre (2012) Piracy news and fig-
ures. Accessed March 30, 2012, http://www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-
reporting-centre/piracynewsafigures.
Kirk M (2011) Ending Somali piracy against American and allied
shipping. Accessed September 16, 2011, http://kirk.senate
.gov/pdfs/KirkReportfinal2.pdf.
National Weather Service (2012) WAVEWATCH III® model.
Accessed December 1, 2012, http://polar.ncep.noaa.gov/
waves/wavewatch/wavewatch.shtml.
National Weather Service (2013) Numerical weather prediction
links. Accessed January 15, 2013, http://www.srh.noaa.gov/
ssd/nwpmodel/html/nogaps.htm.
Nelson R, Goossens S (2011) Counter-piracy in the Arabian
Sea: Challenges and opportunities for GCC action. Accessed
September 16, 2011, http://csis.org/files/publication/110509
_GulfAnalysis_Counter_piracy_inthe_ArabianSea.pdf.
Sanchez SM (2005) NOLHdesigns spreadsheet. Accessed November
15, 2012, http://diana.cs.nps.navy.mil/SeedLab/.
Slootmaker L (2011) Countering piracy with the next-generation
piracy performance surface model. Masters thesis, Naval Post-
graduate School, Monterey, CA.
Verification Letter
William C. Lingsch, Commander, Naval Meteorology and
Oceanography Command writes:
1. “The work described in the paper “User Focus and
Simulation Improve Predictions of Piracy Risk” was very
influential in the development of the pirate-presence model
that underlies the Pirate Attack Risk Surface (PARS). The
PARS, produced at the Naval Oceanographic Office, is
used by U.S. and eventually multinational forces combating
piracy in the Somali Basin Region.
2. “The research team, and in particular LT Slootmaker,
were instrumental in forging links with relevant opera-
tional communities, including the Office of National Intel-
ligence (ONI), counter-piracy forces, and PARS developers.
Her work informed the development of the model of pirate
behavior implemented in the pirate-presence model, and
the model elements introduced on the basis of this work
were shown experimentally to be very influential.
3. “The experimental results described in the paper have
been crucial in identifying the most relevant aspects of the
piracy problem which has influenced the operational imple-
mentation, and going forward informs our understanding
of priorities for refining intelligence parameters and future
features of the PARS product.”
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